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Abstract 
If there is a geographical area that will be particularly affected 
by the tragedy of September 11, that will be the international borders 
of the United States. It is understandable that a country that enters in a 
state of war after been attacked with enormous losses, reacts by 
closing its international borders. Such immediate reaction has now 
been substituted by a more strict control over everything that crosses 
the border but, a fact remains, the border life is not going to be what it 
used to before September 11. In the short run, everything that crosses 
the border has slowed down by new controls. In the long run many 
things will return to what it was before that Tuesday, but for a long 
while, life at the border will not be the same. 
An intense interaction of more than twelve million people from 
the two sides of the U.S.-Mexico border have made us live in many 
instances as if the border does not exist. This is the case among many 
of us in the way we practice our family life. For the planning of 
weddings, birthdays, reunions, ceremonies, the border is more virtual 
than real. This is reversed as we get more serious in what it means to 
the space where institutions, the laws and the governments reminds us 
that there is a line that marks the beginning and the end of two 
different nations. 
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I. Part one: The present 
One of the effects of what happened on September 11 is that we 
border people have been confronted with an increase in the number of 
instances where we are reminded that the border makes a difference. 
Our own identities will be pressured to be conscious of which side of 
the border we really belong to. We might continue to have a lot of 
things in common with the people of the other side but we are bound 
to be more frequently reminded that we are not the same at the two 
sides of the border. The border might be changing from being 
something that unites to something that divides. Perhaps that is the 
nature of the concomitant relations between sovereignty and the 
nation’s borders. It is understandable that a country which sovereignty 
has been violated as viciously as it was that of the United States on 
September 11, wants to make sure that its international borders are 
protected regardless of how good the relations are with its neighboring 
countries. Taking care of the integrity of the national sovereignty is 
certainly not something that a country could delegate to a neighboring 
country. This is similar to saying that there is nothing more internal or 
domestic than taking care of one’s own borders. In this sense, an 
international border cannot be the same during conditions of war than 
during conditions of peace. Both, Mexico and Canada would have to 
wait until the conditions of war declared by the president of the United 
States are significantly modified, to see border life restored back to 
normal. Time Magazine of June 11, 2002 (vol. 152. num. 23) had a 
lengthy coverage about the border. The main thesis of that unusually 
broad coverage was how promising the US-Mexico border region was 
as a place of convergence of the best opportunities for economic
A virtual contradiction between international migration and human rights 
8 
growth that the process of globalization and trilateralization had brought to the three NAFTA 
countries. Time Magazine writers of that issue portrayed a very optimistic scenario based on the 
realities of a thriving process of integration of the three NAFTA economies, most particularly that 
between Mexico and the United States and even more particularly at the border region we share. 
That optimistic scenario was one of the many casualties of the terrorist attack. 
Map 1 
MEXICANS IN THE U.S.: A COUNTRY OF 24 MILLION 
 
Source: Time Magazine, June 11, 2001 (vol. 152, N. 23) 
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 
From terrorist attack on, the border between United States and Mexico will be making more 
difference in our lives than ever before. It is likely however, that this will not be something 
permanent. A lot of new adjustments we, border people, will have to make as a different meaning 
of the border emerges from the actual crisis. But vital needs will not change. We still have to eat; 
we still have to provide for our families, we still have to seek the cooperation of our neighbors for 
the common tasks that geography imposes on us, people of the two sides, such as a shared 
environment. We still have to seek on the other side what we are lacking in ours. We will continue 
to have things that the people of the other side still needs. We still have to barter and exchange and 
share markets across the border. We still have to produce together the rules of the games we share. 
Those vital needs that geography has made us share will become more concrete, more evident to 
the people of the two sides. As the trauma of the terrorist attack allow us to see through the smoke 
of what was left burning and the dust of what it was demolished. We have to learn how to be 
patient until that happens. We, U.S. border neighbors, will need to be understanding and patient 
with the measures of control that the United States will have to take to protect herself against 
terrorism. The border makes us the closest foreigners to the United States. There are times when 
this is an opportunity. There are also times when that is a challenge for good neighboring. Our 
sense of solidarity with the American families who lost a loved one had to be followed by our 
patience until they find the way to collect themselves to go on as a nation. The way we understand 
each other on the two sides of the border will be followed by the rest of the two countries in the 
way both will deal with each other. We need an effort to improve our mutual understanding of the 
way we are because no matter how smart we are, we are not going to be able to change geography. 
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II. Part two: The history 
Let me now change gears to a more specific question of the 
U.S.-Mexico border relations that will have an impact over all aspects 
of the border life and of the bilateral relations in general. That is the 
question of immigration of Mexicans to the United States. 
I would like to start my reflections on the phenomenon of 
Mexican migration to the United States with a historical perspective 
about how is it that we are where we are on this theme and where it’s 
likely that we will go from here. 
Before September 11 it seemed like the governments of Mexico 
and the United States were closer than ever before to an agreement on 
the question of migration (The Economist). This raises a common 
sense question, how come it has taken so long? It is only logical that a 
bilateral agreement is the path to follow for a bilateral problem that is 
caused by factors located at the two sides of the border.  
I think that there has not been enough debate about this question 
in Mexico. There is not enough historical awareness about certain 
elements that have made such a rational option of a bilateral 
agreement so difficult to reach by the two governments. It is certainly 
not because such an option has escaped the minds of the leaders of the 
two nations (Olloqui, 2001). I don’t think there is enough awareness in 
Mexico of the extent to which certain laws pertaining to the legal 
context of labor relations in the United States have been in the way. I 
am referring, for instance, to the famous Wagner Labor Act of 1935.  
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This law established the legal frame within which labor relations were to be conducted in the 
United States, and the meaning was good news for the industrial workers but bad news for the farm 
workers. 
They were not included in the new legal frame under which labor rights were granted to 
industrial workers. The important point is that such labor legislation excluded farm workers from 
the legal definition of an “employee” for whom the rights of this law were granted (See, 29 U.S.C. 
Section 151 sec 152(3)). This Law was amended by the Taft-Hartley Labor Act passed by the U.S. 
Congress in 1947 an then amended by the Landrum-Griffing Act, which was passed by Congress in 
1959; however, the original exclusion of agricultural workers from the right to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice remain unchanged. This in fact 
signified a discrimination against farm workers from the legal basis upon which industrial workers 
were to be treated by U.S. employers. Behind this de jure discrimination was the development of a 
structural context of an asymmetry of power between farm workers and their employers in the 
United States. The understanding of such an asymmetry of power lies behind the understanding of 
why it has been so difficult for the United States and Mexico to reach an agreement on the 
migration question.  
As it was demonstrated in the classic study of the bracero program made by Dr. Ernesto 
Galarza, in his book Merchants of Labor; A History of the Bracero Program, published in 1964, 
the bracero agreements were thought to be a rational solution to the migrant workers question by 
the political leaders of the two countries. But, as it was so eloquently explained by Dr. Galarza, far 
from being a rational solution for the migrant workers, the bracero agreements became an 
instrument at the service of the U.S. growers. The U.S. agribusiness used the bracero agreements to 
legitimize and perpetuate the conditions of exploitation under which the Mexican migrant workers 
were treated in the United States (Galarza, 1996). This is not to suggest the same peasants were 
treated any better in Mexico. The post war years were a time when peasants as a social class were 
increasingly abandoned by the Mexican government and by Mexico’s emergent middle and upper 
classes, in the context of a dramatic change in the nation (Torres, 1979). At the middle of the 
Twentieth Century, Mexico changed from being a country based on an agrarian society to a country 
based on a new urban society that had its economic base on industry and services.  
In the Mexican government circles there was for many years the notion that the bracero 
agreements were a model to be followed to regulate the migratory situation. This notion derived 
from the reading of the written terms of the first bracero agreement signed by the two governments 
in 1942. Indeed, the written texts of that first agreement spoke of vary favorable conditions for the 
Mexican migrant workers (Olloqui, op. cit.). There was, however an enormous distance between 
the written text and the reality. Ernesto Galarza tried very hard to persuade the Mexican 
government at the end of the second World War, as one can read in his memoranda to the President 
of Mexico, found in the Mexico’s National Archives by Jaime Vélez Storey and partially published 
with John Mraz (Mraz and Veléz-Storey, 1996).  Through a series of articles published by the 
prestigious journal El Trimestre Económico in the nineteen fifties, Galarza tried to persuade the 
Mexican government that the words of the first bracero agreement were something substantially 
different than the reality lived in the United States by the Mexican migrant workers. The 
asymmetry of power between them and their U.S. employers determined the abysmal difference 
between the words and the reality of the bracero agreement. The history of such an asymmetry of 
power derived from a historical context in which the United States government persuaded an 
initially reluctant Mexican government under the presidency of Manuel Ávila Camacho (1942-
1946), to sign the first bracero agreement negotiated and approved by Mexico under the 
geopolitical conditions in which the United States entered the Second World War (Ojeda-Gómez, 
1971). The Mexican government was not in the position to challenge the emergent power of the 
United States. I have argued for a long time that the asymmetry of power between the migrant 
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workers and their U.S. employers was rooted in the asymmetry of power between the governments 
of the United States and Mexico (Bustamante, Jorge, A., 1992). 
The realities of that asymmetry of power were reflected in the racism about the Mexican 
immigrants expressed at the highest circles of the U.S. government ever since the beginning of the 
20th century. John Nance Garner, who was U.S. Vice President years later, once said, “the Mexican 
race as inferior an undesirable as U.S. citizens as they are, should not worry any one because they 
are genetically determined with a homing pigeon instinct of always return to where they came 
from”.1 The Mexican government did not have the power, nor the will to protect its people against 
such “character assassination” statements. Nor to set the record straight that what the United States 
was referring as an immigration policy was in reality a labor policy. It should be said also that, at 
the end of the Second World War, there was an increasing gap between the interest of the Mexican 
peasants and the interest of the Mexican government of the post war years. This was particularly 
the case under the administration of president Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) (García-Cantú, 1992). 
Such a gap explained the beginning of the notion that the emigration of Mexican peasants to the 
United States was an “escape valve”. Under this notion, the emigration of Mexican migrant 
workers to the United States was seen in Mexico as a sort of solution to the pressures, both real and 
potential, derived from the increasing abandonment of the Mexican government of an increasingly 
impoverished peasants. There was an inverse relation of the support the government gave to a new 
social class of industrial entrepreneurs who led the beginning of the economic growth of industry, 
and the abandonment of the country side both, by the government and by the Mexican civil society. 
Behind the “push factors” of the emigration from Mexico to the United States were Mexico’s lack 
of capabilities to achieve modernization through an industrial development, without abandoning its 
agricultural sector and its farm workers. Mexico as a nation became enchanted with the illusion of 
modernization by turning its back to its past of an agriculture based society.  
Emigration from Mexico to the United States became an “escape valve” that was viewed by 
the Mexican elites as necessary to alleviate the pressures and the costs of the abandonment of 
peasant’s social class. That notion of emigration to the United States as an “escape valve” became a 
predominant ideology of the Mexican government about emigration to the United States, that 
obscured the realities of exploitation and rampant violations of human and labor rights of the 
Mexican immigrants in that country throughout the “bracero period” (1942-1964).  
The decade of the 50’s were the years when the Mexican government found that there was 
no political cost in doing nothing for the Mexican migrant workers in the United States. This 
marked the context in which the Mexican government tried very hard to cover up the conditions 
under which the Mexican migrant workers were treated in the United States. I had an argument 
with a Mexican Consul in a U.S. border State right after I posed as an undocumented immigrant in 
1971, as part of the research for my doctoral dissertation, after he flatly denied there were Mexican 
undocumented immigrants in the United States. I had to refer to my “participant observation” 
recent experience (Bustamante, 1975). When I asked him how come he had to lie to me denying the 
existence of what I just had witnessed, he made me promises that I will never reveal his name he let 
me read a “circular”, an internal memo from the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores of the 
Mexican government where an instruction was very clear, not to expressively recognized nor to 
make any statement alluding to the illegal presence of Mexican immigrants in the United States. 
Before 1964 and years after, the Mexican government had as a top priority to persuade the U.S. 
government of the renewal of the Bracero agreements. This interest was an important factor that 
explained why the Mexican government was so complacent about the impunity with which 
frequent incidents of violations of human and labor rights of Mexican immigrants were taking 
                                                     
1
  This and other equally racist arguments can be found in U.S. Congress. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
Seasonal Agricultural Laborers from Mexico, 69th Congress, 1st Session, 1929. 
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place mostly in Texas and California. Before 1964 the Mexican government was too busy lobbying 
for renewed versions of the bracero agreement with an increasing indifference about the distance 
between the written terms of these agreements and the realities lived by the Mexican migrant 
workers.  
This was helped by an increasing corruption as a way of life at all levels of the Mexican 
government and, by the political control over the Mexican peasantry through the Confederación 
Nacional Campesina (CNC), which proved over the years to be a very efficient mechanisms of 
manipulation of the PRI’s “peasants’ sector” through a mixture of populism and corruption which 
gave shape to the rise of “caciques”, a sort of bosses, who ruled the country side of Mexico by a 
combination of patriarchal protection to supporters and an iron hand, full of impunity, to handle 
opponents. This way the PRI ruled most of Mexico from 1929 until the year 2000. 
The works of Ernesto Galarza explained the conditions under which it became functional for 
the two sides; on the one hand, for the interest of the Mexican government of maintaining an 
“escape valve” of Mexican emigration of an increasingly impoverished, unemployed, uneducated, 
unorganized underclass of Mexicans and, on the other hand, an interest of U.S. agribusiness in 
maintaining a source of cheap labor (Galarza, Ernesto, 1970). This explains why at the end of the 
last bracero agreement in 1964 the Texas and California’s growers associations, and the Mexican 
government, became the most persistent proponents of the renewal of the bracero programs (Craig, 
1971). 
The ideology of the escape valve inhibited the Mexican government from defending or 
actually protecting the Mexican migrants in the United States, other than through rhetorical 
references. Far from being a solution to the problems associated to migration between the two 
countries, the bracero agreements became concomitant to the rise of the undocumented migration. 
As it was documented in Julián Samora’s book Los Mojados, The Wetback Story published in 1972, 
by the time of the end of the last of the bracero agreements in 1964, there were more Mexicans 
crossing as undocumented immigrants than the number of “braceros” contracted through the 
bilateral agreements at the pick of their numbers. 
The absence of a political cost for the Mexican government for doing nothing for the 
Mexican migrants in the United States was not independent of the Mexican civil society’s general 
indifference about their plight.  
I had a personal experience associated to such indifference. When I returned to Mexico in 
the early seventies, after having finished my studies for a doctoral degree in sociology. I returned as 
a Ph.D. candidate to Mexico to join an institute at the National University of Mexico (UNAM). As 
a faculty member, I submitted a research project on the Mexican emigration to the United States. 
This research project was turned down by a panel of scholars from the elite of the social sciences in 
Mexico. When I was able to obtain a response from one of them about the reasons to turn down my 
research project he said to me, “frankly speaking, Jorge, you were a disappointment to us”, he said. 
Then added, “you spent so many years in the United States to obtain a doctoral degree in sociology 
and when you come back, you submit a research proposal on something that is not even a 
problem”. Indeed, the emigration of Mexican migrant workers to the United States was viewed 
more as a solution than as a problem, not only within the Mexican government, but also among 
those who held a critical perspective at the highest levels of Mexican academia. The lack of support 
in Mexico for the research on the phenomena of emigration of Mexicans to the United States 
forced me to return to the United States where my interest in doing research on the migratory 
phenomena received support at the University of Texas at Austin where I was hired with a tenure 
track faculty position. Years later, after publishing extensively in the United States, I was invited to 
come back to Mexico by El Colegio de México, where I found sufficient support to continue my 
research interest on the subject of Mexican emigration to the United States.  
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I have studied that indifference of the Mexican government and the Mexican civil society 
and I have come up with a hypothesis. That is, that such an indifference was not unrelated to a 
generally unrecognized Mexican racism. It was not until the “Chiapas rebellion” that the question 
of Mexican racism, virtually came out of the closet, as a deeply entrenched part of the Mexican 
culture. The Mexican migrants have been viewed by the Mexican middle and upper social classes 
as something distant from them. As if the plight of the Mexican migrants about the constant 
violations of their human and labor rights in the United States and in Mexico was something 
virtually happening in a different planet, or something that was happening to people with whom the 
middle and upper classes of Mexico had nothing to do. It was certainly not racism in any pure form. 
The disdain of the Mexican middle and upper social classes about the problems of the Mexican 
migrants in the United States had elements of classism. That is, a social distance felt by the middle 
and upper classes from the peasants of Mexico. This explains why the plight of the Mexican 
migrant workers was never taken to the streets by any Mexican organization, particularly by any 
one of those who claim to protect or defend the interest of the Mexican poor or the Mexican 
peasants. It has not been until very recently that public institutions such as the Mexican Catholic 
Church have expressed concern and have begun to support few programs in defense of the Mexican 
migrants. For many decades the principal institutions representing the Mexican civil society, the 
Churches, the unions, the political parties or students organizations, did no more than rhetorical 
references when an incident of abuse of the human rights of the migrants reach the mass media and 
then, reflecting more anti-American sentiments than sincere concerns for the migrants. 
This long time indifference of the Mexican civil society about the plight of the Mexican 
migrants has not been sufficiently studied. It remains as a gross incongruence. The dependence that 
the national economy of Mexico has had of the remittances of U.S. dollars made by the migrant 
workers in the United States had no congruence with the rampant indifference of the Mexican 
middle and upper classes about the problems of the migrant workers. Only exports of Mexican oil, 
industrial manufactures and tourism, have produced more U.S. dollars per year than the close to ten 
billion dollars send to the Mexican economy via the remittances of the Mexican migrant workers 
from the United States last year alone (Olloqui, op. cit.). There is not enough consciousness in 
Mexico of what it would be the social consequences of exhaustion or even a diminishing of migrant 
workers’ remittances from the United States. 
Returning to the years of the bracero program, a paradox should be noted. The end of the 
bracero programs was basically due to the pressures exerted by the AFL-CIO.2 Through several 
decades the AFL-CIO was one of the most important anti-immigrant forces in the United States 
(García, 1980). Not only were they successful in ending the bracero programs, but also they were 
the principal proponents of anti-immigrant legislation for decades.3 That ended on February 17, of 
1999 when the Executive Committee of the AFL-CIO in a meeting in New Orleans, made a 180-
degree change of course. From then on, the AFL-CIO has become the most vocal proponent of a 
“blanket amnesty” to undocumented immigrants. To be sure this change was not an act of nature. 
Behind it was the surging of a new Latino leadership arriving to the upper echelons of the AFL-
CIO.4 These new leaders conveyed the message to the top that an inclusion of undocumented 
immigrants in the rank and file of the AFL-CIO, not only would bring a new source of union fees 
but a new dimension of international involvement and political clout to an otherwise weakening 
political strength of the AFL-CIO. It was a matter of watching the demographic trends of the Latino 
population in various circles of the American life to make sense out of this change. 
                                                     
2
  México, Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (STPS), Los Braceros, México, D.F.: STPS. 1964. 
3
  U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 1926. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 1926; U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S1917. Appropriations Hearings. 
1953; Taylor, Paul Schuster, Labor on the Land: Collected Writings, 1930-1970. New York, N.Y.: Arno Press. 1981. 
4
  This was confirmed in a letter of an AFL-CIO representative in Mexico City. 
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An important factor in the absence of a bilateral agreement on the migratory phenomena 
between Mexico and the United States has been the distance between the predominant definitions 
of this phenomenon in the governmental circles of the two countries respectively, as well as within 
the political elites and, the predominant views of the public opinion about the presence of 
undocumented immigrants from Mexico within the United States. From the first economic 
recession of the 20th Century in the United States in 1907 to all the subsequent ones until the 
present, a pattern has always appeared basically consisting of the following sequence, a) the rise of 
unemployment rates and other signs of a recession catch the public attention; b) politicians make an 
association between the rise of unemployment and the presence of the immigrant workers; c) there 
is a social construction of immigrant workers as “escape goats” of the recession; d) politicians then 
propose anti-immigrant measures as a solution to the economic crisis; e) the vulnerability of 
immigrants as subjects of human rights increases together with the impunity of the abusers; f) the 
economic recession subsides; g) that is followed by an end of the anti-immigrant furor. 
The recession that came as the result of the oil cartel action taken by OPEC countries in 1974 
was not an exception to such a pattern. Those were the years when General Leonard Chapman was 
appointed as Commissioner of U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). He coined the 
phrase of a “silent invasion” in reference to the presence of undocumented immigrants from 
Mexico.5 He gave testimony to various U.S. congressional committees speaking about estimates of 
20 million undocumented immigrants from Mexico. It was only after the end of his tenure as 
Commissioner of INS, that his successor, Leonel Castillo, lowered previous estimates to 3 million. 
The enormous difference in the estimates that two successive commissioners of the INS presented 
to U.S. congressional committees made evident the extent to which previous estimates had been a 
fabrication made to substantiate the notion of a “silent invasion” with some base numbers of 
ideological origin to the political construction of the Mexican immigrant as an “escape goat”. It 
was under General Chapman that the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States 
crystallized in a definition of a phenomenon of Mexican immigration to the United States as a 
crime related phenomena. This became a predominant definition in the United States government 
circles where there was a consensus to reject any recognition of the existence of a demand in the 
United States of the labor force of the undocumented immigrant, particularly in the agricultural 
production of California and Texas.6 There was a social construction of the Mexican 
undocumented immigrants as criminals that led to the notion in the United States that the only 
solution to a “problem” defined as one of criminal nature, was either a police or a military type of 
solution (Bustamante, Jorge A, 1983). This notion was concomitant to another one that the only 
solution to the “Mexican illegal question”, had to be unilateral (Senator Simpson (quotation)).  
Such a position of the United States prompted a delayed reaction of the Mexican government 
during the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) expressing opposition to what was termed an 
unfair and unjustified “criminalization” of the undocumented immigrant from Mexico. Through the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Solana, the Mexican government came out with a 
contrasting definition of the undocumented immigration from Mexico to the United States as 
derived from a de facto international labor market. 
The Mexican reaction defining the phenomena of undocumented immigration of Mexicans in 
the United States as basically a labor phenomena, contradicted the predominant definition of the 
same phenomena in the United States governmental circles. The net result of this contradiction 
between the predominant definitions in the two governments about the same migratory 
phenomenon was a status quo. Although, the position of the Mexican government during the 
ninety’s was never beyond the confinements of the rhetorical.  
                                                     
5
 U.S. House of Representatives, Report No. 94-506, 1975.  
6
  Meissner, Doris (Hearings). 
CEPAL - SERIE Población y desarrollo  N° 36 
15 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) saw, that whatever degrees of freedom he had in 
negotiating with the United States, they were crippled very early in his administration by the crisis 
of 1994. This not only provoked a drastic devaluation of the peso but a close call for the forfeiture 
of the Mexican foreign debt. A collapse was avoided thanks to president Bill Clinton decision to 
bail out the Mexican government by a loan of 20 billion dollars. 
President Zedillo owed so much politically to president Clinton that he couldn’t find room 
for any criticism in spite of the deaths of Mexican migrants do to the beginning of the “operation 
gatekeeper” in 1994. This was designed not to stop, as one would expect from an immigration law 
enforcement agency, but to deviate the route of entry’s of undocumented immigrants from Mexico 
into the United States toward areas away from the visibility of urban eyes like those of San 
Diegans. As it was recognized by the chief of the border patrols in a written testimony to a U.S. 
congressional committee, the design of “operation gatekeeper” was made under the assumption that 
undocumented immigrants were going to get discouraged by the risk of death presented by the 
areas of crossing where the migrants were deviated to.7 These were mountainous terrain East from 
San Diego or the deep irrigation channels, such as the All American Canal or the inhospitable 
desert areas between California and Arizona, where soon enough the number of migrants deaths 
begun to climb. Risks of dehydration in the desert lands or hypothermia during the winter months 
or drowning in the irrigation channels, did not discouraged the inflow of undocumented 
immigrants, they caused their death in stead. As it is shown by the increase in the number of deaths 
of migrants presented in the following maps: 
Map 2 
LOCATION OF DEATHS OF MIGRANTS IN THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER. 1995 
Source: Bustamante, Jorge, “Proposition 187 and Operation Gatekeeper: Cases for the Sociology of International 
Migrations and Human Rights” in Migraciones Internacionales vol. 1, No. 1, julio-diciembre 2001. El Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United 
Nations. 
                                                     
7
  U.S. Border Patrol, “Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond” Prepared testimony for a Congressional Hearings, see, 
www.stopgatekeeper.com. 
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Map 3 
LOCATION OF DEATHS OF MIGRANTS IN THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER. 1998 
Source: Bustamante, Jorge, “Proposition 187 and Operation Gatekeeper: Cases for the Sociology of 
International Migrations and Human Rights” in Migraciones Internacionales vol. 1, No. 1, julio-diciembre 2001. 
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
Map 4 
LOCATION OF DEATHS OF MIGRANTS IN THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER. 2001 
Source: Bustamante, Jorge, “Proposition 187 and Operation Gatekeeper: Cases for the Sociology of 
International Migrations and Human Rights” in Migraciones Internacionales vol. 1, No. 1, julio-diciembre 2001. 
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte. 
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the 
United Nations. 
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Very soon after the starting of “operation gatekeeper” in 1994 the number of migrants dying 
in the area where “operation gatekeeper” was put into effect, showed clearly that the assumption 
based on which “operation gatekeeper” was designed, was wrong. This was a conclusion reached 
by a report of the GAO of the U.S. Congress after conducting an investigation of the extent to 
which the “operation gatekeeper” had reached it’s stated objectives.8 What really happened with 
the immigration flows of undocumented immigrants from Mexico was not a diminishing of the 
volumes of their flow to the United States but a change of places of entry toward the west from the 
traditional areas through San Diego. In that process, the number of deaths of migrants has been 
climbing at a rate of more than one migrant killed per day as an average, in the area covered by 
“operation gate keeper”. Some non governmental organizations such as the Rural Legal Foundation 
of California and the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties, 
criticized their own government for the violation of human rights that “operation gatekeeper” 
implied as they alleged it’s implementation was in violation of the chart of human rights of the Pan 
American Union (OAS). No Mexican institution, let alone the Mexican government, reacted in 
solidarity to such a criticism made by American NGO’s and by American citizens. In fact, when 
president Zedillo was invited by governor Gray Davis to visit California in May of 1998, he 
declared to the Spanish Daily La Opinion, in the verge of his visit to California, that the deaths of 
the migrants were neither a responsibility of the United States nor that of Mexico.  
These and many other things changed with the emergence of the political leadership of 
Vicente Fox. He was able to correctly interpret a general feeling of Mexicans being fed up with the 
ruling of the PRI, which had been in power for the last 71 years. Vicente Fox ran a political 
campaign for the election of president of Mexico based on a promise of change, particularly a 
change from corruption in the practice of government. As a governor of the State of Guanajuato 
and as a prosperous rancher in that State, he was familiar with the phenomena of emigration of 
Mexicans to the United States. Guanajuato being one of the Mexican provinces with an oldest 
tradition of emigration of its people to the United States. Comparably speaking, Guanajuato had a 
high concentration of population at the beginning of the 20th Century, when the U.S. Congress 
decided to appropriate some monies to fund the recruitment of Mexican workers. The First World 
War had stopped the influx of immigrants from Europe. Blacks had gone north from the Deep 
South to substitute European immigrants in the lowest paid occupations. The conditions of the War 
had produced a massive need for agricultural production for exports. It had produced also some 
labor shortages, particularly in Texas and California. The first anti immigrant laws of the United 
States had succeeded in expelling the Chinese first, and then the Japanese and then the Philippines 
in the wake of the “Asian bared zone”. This created a sort of a vacuum of cheap labor, the 
sensitivity of which was taken to Washington by some Congressman of California who after the 
first economic recession of the 20th Century in 1907, argued in the U.S. Congress that, the 
Mexicans should be sought after as immigrant workers for which purpose public monies should be 
appropriated. The idea was approved and recruiters were sent south to Mexico. The U.S. 
Congressional records tell the story. Congressman from California argued that the “Mexican race” 
was physically fitted for stoop labor because they were shorter, closer to the ground, as opposed to 
the white race who was born for stand up work thus, fitted for the industrial production (Feagin, 
1999). Racist ideologies of white supremacy had penetrated the ivory towers of U.S. academia at 
the turn of the Century. Ideas of white supremacy were incorporated in the main stream of U.S. 
social science (Feagin, op. cit.).  
American recruiters were sent south to Mexico with the goal of attracting Mexican workers 
to fill the vacuums of cheap labor left with the immigration restrictions against immigrants from 
Asia. U.S. labor recruiters could not find concentrations of people in Mexico right across the 
                                                     
8
  U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, “INS’ Southwest Border Strategy; Resource and Impact 
Issues Remain after Seven Years” August, 2001, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. 2001.  
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border. Some of the actually most populated cities of the Mexican northern border, like Tijuana 
where I live, didn’t exist as urban settlements at the beginning of the 20th Century. So, U.S. labor 
recruiters had to go farther south until they found higher concentrations of population. That is why 
they reached Guanajuato thus, introducing what soon became a tradition in that State, namely, to 
emigrate to the United States in search for higher wages. 
Vicente Fox knew as a governor of that State, of the importance of remittances of dollars 
from the United States by the Mexican migrant workers. So, in his political campaign for the 
Mexican presidency he called migrant workers “heroes” recognizing for the first time the 
importance of migrant workers remittances in the Mexican balance of payments, which in the year 
2002 represented more than 9 billion dollars per year, making these remittances of U.S. dollars 
within the top sources of dollars for the Mexican economy. Calling migrants “heroes” was quite a 
change from the ideology that saw migrants as an “escape valve”. 
Vicente Fox visited the United States and Canada in August of 2000, after his electoral 
victory that made him president. During such a visit he surprised many Mexicans when he said that 
the deaths of migrants at the border would be “intolerable” in his administration. He also surprised 
the United States with his audacious proposals of an open border for Mexican migrants after 
sufficient closing of the wage gaps between the United States and Mexico. The idea was not 
accepted in the highest circles of the U.S. government but it certainly made Americans think about 
it. Fox’s proposals on migrant labor had the legitimacy of a “democracy bonus” that had come from 
an electoral victory under the most free elections in the history of Mexico. The image of Vicente 
Fox as a champion of democracy, after having been in his past a regional director of Coca-Cola for 
Mexico and Central America, was not difficult to be swallowed by the American media. Fox came 
to the United States as president elect, free of the strings attached previously to president Zedillo. 
Soon enough it became clear that Fox had a powerful allay in the United States, also a former 
rancher who became president of the United States almost at the same time than Vicente Fox. 
None of the U.S. presidents before George W. Bush, including his father, had deviated from 
the notion that the “illegal aliens” were criminals. This is why the position taken by president Bush 
during his visit with Vicente Fox at his ranch in Guanajuato, represented such a significant change 
of U.S. immigration policies. Bush’s speech in that occasion included a recognition, for the first 
time, of a U.S. presence of U.S. labor demands as a factor that shaped the phenomena of 
immigration of Mexicans to the United States. His speech included also references to the human 
and labor rights of the Mexican immigrants in the United States and, perhaps the most important 
change, he referred to the need to negotiate a bilateral solution to the immigration question. The 
most serious obstacle for a bilateral agreement on the migrant question had been removed. A very 
efficient diplomacy under Fox’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jorge G. Castañeda in preparation of 
this presidential meeting in Guanajuato was probably an important part of such a change in the U.S. 
perspective about the presence of Mexican migrants in the United States.  
Before this change happened there was an irreconcilable contrast between the predominant 
definition in the United States of the presence of undocumented immigrants from Mexico as a 
crime related phenomena that can only be solved by a police or military type of solution that could 
only come unilaterally and, on the other hand, the predominant definition in Mexico of the same 
phenomena as one of labor nature, shaped by the factors that create a U.S. labor demand, in 
interaction with the factors that create a Mexican labor supply. A power asymmetry between the 
governments of the two countries had maintained a status quo of that contradiction for more than 
thirty years, ever since the years of General Leonard Chapman, as high commissioner of the U.S. 
INS who had coined the term of a “silent invasion” that permeated the U.S. political culture as 
reflected by references in the U.S. mass media. 
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Under this ideological environment, the abuses of human and labor rights against the 
Mexican immigrants came to the surface through mass media showing the conditions of impunity 
under which U.S. law enforcers of various levels from the local to the federal were involved in 
incidents of violence against Mexican immigrants with no consequences.9 These were years when 
extreme cases of exploitation were reported by U.S. media, such as one who provoked legal action 
with charges of slavery against a U.S. employer. 
The Mexican government was incapable of doing anything concrete against the increasing 
vulnerability of Mexicans in the United States. During the decades of the 70’s, 80’s and, 90’s the 
most important source of legal protection of Mexican immigrants came from Mexican American 
organizations in the United States, such as MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund), National Council of la Raza, LULAC (League of United Latin American 
Citizens) and, GI-Forum, in addition to numerous community organizations in California, Texas, 
Colorado and New Mexico. 
The legal support and the protection of the human rights of the Mexican migrants were not 
coming from Mexico during these three decades. As it was demonstrated by the litigation of Brown 
versus Texas Board of Education, there were lawyers hired and paid by Mexican American 
organizations who were concerned for the vulnerability of Mexican migrants as subjects of human 
and labor rights. Such was the case where a federal court in Houston declared unconstitutional to 
exclude from public schools the children of undocumented immigrants from Mexico. The author 
was an expert witness in that trial which represented an important victory for the immigrants after a 
fair recognition that the majority of them pay taxes and social security while they work in the 
United States.  
The role of Mexican Americans in the protection of the human and labor rights of Mexican 
immigrants has not been sufficiently recognized in Mexico, except for the award “Águila Azteca”, 
which is the highest granted by the Mexican government to non-nationals for services to Mexicans. 
This award was received by Antonia Hernández, president of MALDEF, Julián Samora, professor 
of the University of Notre Dame, Blandina Cárdenas, civil rights activist and scholar of Texas. 
There was however, a gradual change from rhetoric only, to a more than symbolic action, 
during the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, where the Mexican government reinforced 
consular protection. Political appointees occupied some of the most important Mexican Consul 
General offices in the United States whose performance showed a change from rhetoric to action. 
This was expressed in a more conspicuous and closer contacts between the new Mexican Consuls 
and the local communities of Mexican origin in the cities of Los Angeles, San Diego, Chicago, 
Houston, and San Antonio, as they were shifting in the predominance of self-denominations from 
Mexican Americans to Chicanos, to Hispanics to Latinos. 
By the time Vicente Fox was elected as president of Mexico the “Latino vote”, had surfaced 
in the political scene of the United States as a political force to be reckon with. The close victory of 
Ms. Loretta Sanchez over her republican opponent in 1996 in the District that includes Orange 
County in California was a clear indication of the difference that the vote of former Mexican 
undocumented immigrants could make, after they had become U.S. citizens. That election, in what 
use to be a strong hold of the Republican Party showed a pattern. Mexican undocumented 
                                                     
9
  Los Angeles Times published a series of reports from April 22 to April 24, 1993, including the following text: “Some agents 
complain that commanders place so much emphasis on amassing drug seizures  	
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Washington—that supervisors turn a blind eye to evidence of wrongdoing by agents ... Management will let you do whatever you 
need to do to get the job done to stop drug smuggling. Said Thomas A. Watson a five years Nogales veteran who was fired this 
month for complicity in the cover-up of a fellow agent’s fatal shooting of a suspected trafficker. Drugs are what the chief wanted. 
Drugs made the head lines ... Many agents admit that they prefer drug duty —waiting in remote canyons with automatic weapons to 
waylay traffickers along backcountry trails—to the more prosaic task of apprehending illegal immigrants”. 
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immigrants becoming legal residents of the United States and then U.S. citizens, who’s 
overwhelming, majority joined the Democratic Party. 
President Fox has shown a particular sensitivity for the U.S. minority of Mexican origin 
referred by themselves and by others in the United States as “Latinos”. The fact that more than two 
thirds of them are descendants of Mexican nationals has led President Fox to explicitly include 
them as a part of the Mexican population to whom he is supposed to serve as President of Mexico. 
It could be argued that this is not very orthodox if one takes into account that the majority of 
Latinos are U.S. citizens, Fox however, has contributed to the blurring of national identities which 
begun in the preceding sexenio (six-year term) with the constitutional reform in Mexico that 
instituted a virtual “double nationality”. In fact, this was a constitutional reform which established 
that the Mexican nationality will be considered in Mexico as permanent, regardless of the 
acquisition of other nationalities for Mexicans. If a Mexican citizen gains another country’s 
citizenship, he or she can not exercise his or her citizen’s rights, particularly the right to vote in 
Mexican elections, unless he expressively resigns the other country’s acquired citizenship. This 
reform on Mexican nationality left untouched the constitutional rules for Mexican citizenship. 
Thus, there can be a dual nationality but not a dual citizenship for Mexicans. This distinction is 
confusing in the United States where it is common to equate nationality with citizenship. This is 
not the case in Mexico, where nationality implies certain patrimonial rights given in exclusivity to 
Mexican nationals by the Mexican Constitution, such as the right to own property within the zone 
of 50 kilometers parallel to Mexican borders and 100 kilometers parallel to Mexican coastal lines. 
(Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution). It contributes to the confusion, particularly in the United 
States, president Fox’s insistence, in fact an expressive promise, of granting voting rights to 
Mexican citizens who reside outside of Mexico in presidential elections (only). This is currently a 
very controversial issue in Mexico, given the fact that there are more Mexican citizens in the 
United States (probably 19 million), that in any other Mexican province accept the Federal District 
(the metropolitan area of Mexico City). Part of the controversy in Mexico derives from the 
technical possibility that an electoral victory which decides who will be the president of Mexico, 
might come from the way Mexicans citizens residing outside of Mexico, would vote. It has been 
my opinion that Mexican citizens residing abroad, on a permanent or temporary basis, should have 
the right to vote in Mexican presidential elections. It is the implementation of such a right to vote, 
particularly in the United States, which I think president Fox and other proponents of this idea, 
have not thought out carefully. To my knowledge, non of the proponents of the right to vote for 
Mexicans abroad, has addressed, for instance, the fact that there are laws in the United States 
which require a license issued by the U.S. federal government to conduct political activities for 
other countries within the United States territory, with penalties of fines or prison for violators. Nor 
it has been resolved how the Mexican electoral campaigns in the United States could escape from 
being subjected to U.S.’ own electoral laws, particularly for the electoral propaganda, financing 
and conducting of an electoral campaign. Even worst. Which country’s court system will decide in 
final instance the eventual electoral controversies? Could it be that the U.S. Supreme Court of 
Justice could decide who will be the president of Mexico? These and many other questions should 
be answered in Mexico and in the United States, way before the rules for the implementation of 
such a right to vote for Mexicans abroad allows for its actual exercise.  
The events of last September 11 can only exacerbate the difficulties of these and of any other 
matter pertaining to the realm of the sovereignty of the United States and that of its neighboring 
countries. 
It might well be that president Fox is ahead of his time. The fact is that he is proceeding as if 
he was not. At the very beginning of his administration he created a cabinet level position for Dr. 
Juan Hernandez, a U.S. citizen of Mexican origin (a Latino himself), in charge of matters of 
“Mexicans abroad”. I personally think the creation of such a high level office was a good idea, 
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corresponding to the importance that the ever growing population of Mexican nationals, Mexican 
citizens and U.S. citizens of Mexican origin living in the United States should have in the Mexican 
process of decision making.  
Returning to the migratory question, some comments should be made about the options that 
appear to be more salient in the bilateral negotiations as they were publicly known before the 
events of September 11. There are two conflicting notions in the United States about how to solve 
the migratory question with Mexico. Two contentious parties could not have represent that conflict 
more acutely than, one the one hand, the AFL-CIO promoting a “blanket amnesty” for all 
undocumented immigrants, on the other, the California and the Texas growers associations 
promoting a “guest workers program”. Both have respectively important allies. The respective 
promotions could not be more contradictory. The AFL-CIO side is adamantly  opposed to the 
“guest workers program” claiming that it will be a mechanism of perpetuation of the exploitation of 
migrant workers as they were the old “bracero agreements”. The side of the growers, in the words 
of Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, amnesty will pass “over my cold dead body”. On the AFL-CIO 
side, there are in full support, all Latino organizations of national memberships. On the grower’s 
side, there are in full support, the wealthiest and more conservative side of the Republican Party. 
The general indifference in Mexico about the migrant workers’ plight has prevented a more 
significant participation of the political parties in a public discussion about the mentioned options 
for a U.S.-Mexico agreement on migrant workers. In fact, there has not been a comparable debate 
in Mexico about these or other options on the subject in spite of president Fox unprecedented 
attention to their plight. There are however important implications for the Mexican migrants. The 
option that would be more convenient for the average Mexican migrant worker is what ever comes 
closely to the “amnesty”, a term not accepted by the Mexican government, because it alludes to a 
pardon granted to criminals by the executive of a government. Some confusion has been created in 
the United States with the terms “legalization” or “regularization” preferred by the Mexican 
government’ negotiators. Some Latino organization took, mistakenly, these terms as alternatives to 
amnesty, for which reason they expressed their opposition. In reality the three terms, amnesty, 
legalization and regularization mean the same, in there sought after consequences; namely, making 
“documented” the “undocumented”. This means, the “empowerment” that is brought to the 
undocumented by getting access to institutional protection such as the police or the court system in 
the United States, as any other U.S. tax payer, without taking the risk of being deported. 
This “empowerment” has not taken place in the past with previous temporary migrant U.S. 
visas program, particularly with the old bracero programs, as it was argued before. The main 
reason has been, that none of the temporary visa programs (H1, H2, H2A, etc.) have significantly 
modified the asymmetry of power between the migrant worker and his or her U.S. employer. To the 
extent that amnesty related options could lead to U.S. citizenship and full voting rights, such 
options could indeed signify “empowerment”. let alone the right of unionize and of collective 
bargain. This is not the kind of migrants’ empowerment; the U.S. growers would be interested in 
pursuing. 
Notwithstanding the greater benefit for migrants that could derive from a “legalization” or an 
amnesty related option, the reality is that this is the least likely option to be palatable for the U.S. 
negotiators. In fact, president Bush has stated that he is not going to support this option. 
Particularly after the results of the November 5 elections were known, highlightening the 
triumph of the Republican Party gaining control of the two houses of the legislative power, it does 
not seem to be any chance left for a bilateral agreement on the migratory question. More than a 
year after September eleven, the resulting xenophobia in the United States has no subsided not 
helping the development of an attitude toward immigrants in general an non whites in particular 
that could favor a political climate that could be conducive to a bilateral agreement on the 
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migratory question. It is not likely that the Mexican government would accept just another bracero 
program. Secretary Castaneda already has said so. Not because any political cost in Mexico for 
taking that option but, because that option is adamantly opposed by Latino organizations that 
president Fox have made into his virtual constituency. 
Geopolitics between Mexico and the United States have never been so overlapping as it is 
today and as it looks that will continue to be in the near and not so near future. If there is one factor 
even more important than NAFTA for such a future, that would be the Latino vote.     
Elections in California have shown the political cost that Republican candidates could suffer 
by supporting anti-immigrant measures. Both the elections of 1996 and, more conspicuously the 
election of 1998 showed how the Latino vote of California punished the candidates of the 
Republican Party by giving the victory to Democrats, such as governor Gray Davis and Lieutenant 
Governor Cruz Bustamante. 
The emergence of the Latino vote in California was the result of a paradox derived from the 
reelection campaign of Pete Wilson, which was based in the support of proposition 187. In the way 
“propositions” such as that become a source of Law in the United States, “proposition 187” was 
approved by close to two thirds of the electoral vote of California in the elections of 1994. This 
turned out to be the most anti-Mexican law in the history of the bilateral relations.  
Proposition 187 was placed on the ballots for the gubernatorial elections in California on 
November 8, 1994. Its main objective was “to prevent illegal aliens in the United States from 
receiving benefits or public services in the State of California” (Section 1 of the Text of the 
Proposed Law) and to establish mechanisms aimed at the removal of all undocumented immigrants 
from California.  
According to the New York Law Journal, Proposition 187 was described in the official 
ballot argument as “the first giant stride in ultimately ending the illegal alien invasion” (see 
Stanley Mailman, “California’s Proposition 187 and its Lessons”, New York Law Journal, January 
3, 1995. p. 3 col. 1). On December 14, U.S. District Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer of the Central 
District of California issued a decision to block the implementation of the law until trial. The same 
court decided years later to declare Proposition 187 unconstitutional, basically because it invaded 
the jurisdiction of Federal Immigration Law. 
Reference by the proponents of extending the limitations established for the undocumented 
immigrants to all “aliens”, that is to say, to all Mexicans in California including those with a U.S. 
visa of legal residence, instilled a serious fear in all of Mexican origin population in the State, 
including U.S. citizens. This did not sound absurd to those who remembered the anti-Mexican 
campaign in the thirties where U.S. citizens of Mexican origin were expelled from California back 
to Mexico, as documented by Hoffman in the United States and Carreras de Velazco in México.10 
The paradox was, that a law (“proposition 187”) which was intended against the Mexican 
undocumented immigrants, produced a “fear of God” in all Mexican origin population of 
California. Those among them who were U.S. citizens, went to the next elections (1996-1998-
2000) in California, ready to vote against all candidates of the Republican Party which political 
platform has included strong anti-immigrant language ever since the Republican Party’s convention 
where president’s Bush’s father was elected candidate, to the present.  
Public debate on Proposition 187 was marked by the court’s main argument in its first, and 
again in its final, decision about its unconstitutionality, namely, its violation of the “supremacy 
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  The two best studies on the massive expulsion of Mexicans during the years of the Great Depression are, by Mercedes Carreras de 
Velazco, Los Mexicanos que devolvió la crisis 1929-1932, México, D.F.: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Dirección General de 
Archivo, and Abraham Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican-Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures, 1929-1939. 
Tucson, Arizona, University of Arizona Press. 1974. 
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clause” (immigration matters were of the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government). This 
was perhaps the main reason why there has not been an in-depth discussion of Proposition 187’s 
basic premises. It is argued here that Proposition 187 was based on biased perceptions, tainted by 
racist and xenophobic ideologies, and that its basic provisions represent instances of “institutional 
racism” against people of Mexican origin, identified as such by the color of their skin. It is further 
argued that Proposition 187 was made possible by the conditions of “vulnerability” in which an 
ethnic minority of Mexican origin in general, and Mexican immigrants in particular, have lived in 
the United States as subjects of human rights. 
In order to call a perception “biased”, one has to provide some objective basis to define what 
the “unbiased” perception would be which gives meaning to the former adjective. This purpose 
may be served by the concluding remarks of a research report produced and published by the U.S. 
Department of Labor: 
In effect, migrant workers, so necessary for the success of the labor-intensive U.S. 
agricultural system, subsidize that very system with their own and their family’s indigence. The 
system functions to transfer costs to workers who are left with income so marginal that, for the 
most part, only newcomers and those with no other options are willing to work on our nation’s 
farms (emphasis added). 
The most relevant point of this conclusive statement is the positive impact of migrant 
workers whose presence in the United States implies. So positive, that the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s speaks of it as a subsidy to the U.S. economy. This research finding is in a complete 
contradiction with the basic “findings” on which Proposition 187 was justified to the voters of 
California. These “findings”, as they appear quoted below, take the anti-immigrant prejudice of 
California voters for granted. This explains why there is a reference to “findings” in Proposition 
187, with no reference to their source. It is important to point out that the same U.S. Department of 
Labor study reports that 94 percent of the migrant farm workers included in its research were 
Mexican nationals. 
The quoted paragraph appears on page 40 of the official report entitled: Migrant 
Farmworkers: Pursuing Security in an Unstable Labor Market. It was published as Research 
Report No. 5, based on Data from a National Agricultural Workers Survey conducted by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, published in May of 1994. This publishing date is noteworthy since it means 
that this study was available at the time the text of Proposition 187 was written for the ballots. 
The text of Proposition 187 (the following quotations could be found at 
http://ca94.election.digital.com/e/prop/187txt.html.) 
Section 1 “Findings and Declarations”: 
The People of California find and declare as follows: That they have suffered and are 
suffering economic hardships caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this State. That they 
have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal conduct of 
illegal aliens in this State. 
Then, in Section 5, entitled: “Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services”, a 
Section 10001.5 (c) is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code to read: 
If any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for public social services 
determines or reasonably suspects … that the person is an alien in the United States in violation 
of Federal Law, the following procedures should be followed by the public entity… (3) The entity 
shall notify the State Director of Social Services, the Attorney General of California and the 
United States Immigration Service (INS) of the person of his or her apparent illegal immigration 
status. 
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In a State where INS statistics show that more than 90 percent of apprehensions have 
consisted of Mexican nationals for decades, the term of “illegal alien” is socially synonymous to 
Mexican.  
Let me now revert to the perspective of the events of September 11. 
There is no way of knowing how long the transition will take from the state of war 
proclaimed by president Bush where we are now, back to the conditions where we were before 
September 11. Some analysts of the September 24th’s edition (2001) of the New York Times 
estimated between one to two years. I would like to predict that the question of migration between 
Mexico and the United States would return to where it was before September 11, by the time 
President Bush begins to warm up for his reelection campaign. 
Here is why. There will be basically two factors that will shape the conditions for such a 
come back. One will be a market force. To the extent to which Americans continue uninterested to 
do the jobs Mexican migrants do in the United States, at the wages for which they do it, there is 
going to resurge a U.S. demand for Mexican immigrants’ labor force. As the most prestige 
American economist, Alan Greenspan said it less than two years ago in a testimony to a 
Congressional committee; the United States needs more people to produce more and to obtain more 
taxes if its economy is to expand. A time will come when Alan Greenspan words on immigration 
will not sound as an aberration as they sound today at the time when Americans are in the process 
of closing the borders. 
Here is a good place to bring again the conclusive remarks of the U.S. Labor study on U.S. 
agriculture that I quoted before: “In effect, migrant workers, so necessary for the success of the 
labor intensive U.S. agricultural system, subsidize that very system with their own and their 
family’s indigence”. 
The U.S. needs alluded in this quotation have not disappeared as a consequence of the 
terrorist attack, nor they will disappear in the foreseeable future. That economic need will bring 
back the discussion of a bilateral agreement with Mexico on the migration question. As it is known 
in any city of the Southwest, Mexican immigrant’s labor is needed not only in agriculture but also 
in many other activities without which the United States do not function on a normal basis. Such is 
the case of the restaurant business, the hotel business etc. Table 1 and graph 1 show some changes 
in the U.S. demand for Mexican undocumented labor based on the data gathered for the last eleven 
years by the Zapata Canyon project of El Colegio de México directed by the author. 
Table 1 
UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRANTS THAT HAVE WORKED IN THE UNITED STATES,  
BY TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 1988 - 2001 
Activity (%) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Tourism 8.3 8.2 7.3 8.9 7.9 9.9 8.1 7.9 9.6 10.2 8.4 6.4 6.0 4.7 
Domestic 
service 17.0 23.0 23.3 23.4 21.3 18.2 15.7 15.9 16.7 14.5 14.7 11.0 9.2 8.8 
Other services 6.5 7.0 8.4 6.4 6.3 7.2 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.6 
Farm work 35.0 34.2 33.7 25.7 27.3 29.7 34.1 35.0 32.4 32.2 31.3 31.6 43.6 48.2 
Manufacturin
g 9.7 8.3 6.3 6.9 6.4 5.5 5.9 9.3 11.0 12.5 15.2 20.4 13.5 8.8 
Construction 18.5 16.0 17.6 23.5 23.9 26.1 25.9 25.4 25.0 26.1 25.4 27.0 25.6 27.6 
Self employed 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other 3.4 1.7 2.1 4.2 6.4 2.8 6.0 1.9 2.9 2.7 3.1 2.2 1.2 1.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: project Zapata Canyon. Continuous survey of flow of undocumented Mexican immigrants as they cross the U.S. El 
Colegio de la Frontera Norte. Since 1988 to September of 2001. 
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Graph 1 
TRENDS IN THE U.S. LABOR DEMAND OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS MALE FROM MEXICO, D.F. 
















Source: Bustamante, Jorge, “Proposition 187 and Operation Gatekeeper: Cases for the Sociology of International 
Migrations and Human Rights” in Migraciones Internacionales vol. 1, No. 1, julio-diciembre 2001. El Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte. 
The Mexican immigrant labor is not only necessary for a return to business as usual in the 
United States, is necessary for the recovery of the U.S. economy. President Bush will hear voices 
from his own party and certainly from the competency, speaking about the need to rationalize what 
so far has been a de facto labor market between Mexico and the United States. One where the U.S. 
demands for immigrant labor is as real as the supply of it.  
I said that there were two factors basically in the return of the bilateral relations to where 
they were before September 11. I referred to the sharing of a bilateral de facto labor market as one 
factor. The other is of a different nature. It is the “Latino vote”. As this is growing as a shire 
consequence of demography, it is bound to be of a crucial importance for the election of a U.S. 
president in 1904, particularly in the States of California and Texas that might determine who the 
next president will be. Last elections in California left established an important lesson. The “Latino 
vote” is not impartial to immigration policies. They vote in favor of proponents of pro-immigrant 
measures and they vote against the proponents of anti-immigrant measures. That explains why the 
governor of California and the Lieutenant governor are not of the Republican Party. It is true that 
Latinos have had a history of low voting records but it is also true that those ethnic differences tend 
to disappear when controlled by education levels. As Latinos are improving in their education 
levels they will be voting in greater numbers. Thus, presidential candidates of the two parties are 
going to try hard to obtain the Latino vote in the whole United Sates and this factor will work in 
favor of the return of both governments to the table of negotiations for a bilateral agreement on the 
immigrant labor question. 
Note that I have not alluded to whether the personal relations between the two presidents 
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and more on president Bush’s increasing preoccupation for the impact of immigration on the health 
of the U.S. macro economy, in the sense alluded by Allan Greenspan, as elections of 2004 get 
closer. In my mentioning of the Latino vote, I have alluded to president Bush’ sensitivity for 
Latinos. Of the kind he showed when he expressible rejected Pete Wilson’s support for the 
“proposition 187” while he was governor of Texas. In fact I have alluded to his interest in continue 
taking care of business from the Oval office after 2004.  
Graph 2 


























Source: Bustamante, Jorge, "“Proposition 187 and Operation Gatekeeper: Cases for the Sociology of International 
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III. Part three: a theoretical frame 
A. The dialectics of the vulnerability 
of international migrants 
The basic thrust of this analysis is that a social process exists 
that results in a condition of vulnerability11 of international migrants 
as subjects of human rights. The following diagram titled “Dialectic of 
Migrants’ Vulnerability” depicts this social process, which implies, 1) 
a socio-legal inclusiveness that arises out of a dialectical process 
between two legal notions of sovereignty and, 2) the social 
construction of conditions of vulnerability for international migrants, 
who are displaced by the dynamics of the international relations 
arising from the globalization12 of international markets.  
The theoretical framework (within which the socio-legal 
inclusiveness implied in the diagram) should be understood, is a 
dialectical process. This process begins when a country, exercising its 
sovereignty, duly commits itself to adopting an international standard 
of human rights and remakes that standard constitutionally into a law 
of the land.  
                                                     
11
  This social construct refers to a condition of powerlessness. It precedes the “labeling” understood as an act of power over vulnerable 
people. 
12
  For the purposes of this article, Anthony Giddens definition is the most fitting. “Globalization can … be defined as the 
intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse 
direction from the very distant relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much part of globalization as the lateral 
extension of social connections of time and space.” Giddens, 1990. The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1990. 
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This exercise of sovereignty becomes A) dialectically opposed to another exercise of the 
same legal nature, B) that which makes a constitutional distinction between nationals, on the one 
hand, and immigrants as foreigners, on the other. These two exercises of sovereignty depicted in 
the diagram as dialectically opposed, become interrelated in the practice of international relations 
arising from the phenomenon of globalization.13 Thus, the “thesis” in this dialectical process à la 
Hegel is A), and the “antithesis” is (B); although, historically, (B) has preceded (A).  
More will be said below about the synthesis, namely, integration.14 
In the past, as human societies have confronted problems of power and authority, the source 
or locus of authority has moved from God, to the State, to the people. The definition of 
sovereignty15 has been based chronologically on the three sources. At their origin in medieval times 
under the doctrine of Christian unity, the concepts of “sovereignty” and “sovereign” were one and 
the same, except for the semantic distinction between an attribute and the subject of its enactment. 
The diagram above starts from the Hegelian notion of a dialectic process. Here, this process 
consists of two opposite exercises of sovereignty, each with different objectives and opposed to 
each other as a thesis opposes an antithesis, and out of which a synthesis emerges. Implicit in this 
dialectic is the inclusiveness of two cognitive domains, namely, law and sociology. One is of a 
legal or normative nature and the other of a social nature. The bridge between the two dimensions 
is the passage from a norm to actual human behavior in the empirical context of social relations. 
The diagram assumes such inclusiveness in alluding to a social process in which the main actors 
are those defined constitutionally, as nationals and legally and socially, as foreigners or 
immigrants. The main feature of this inclusiveness is the dialectical dynamic, energized by the 
international relations of globalization. In that context, the vulnerability of international migrants 
becomes the focus of a contradiction between, A) a “classical” notion of the sovereign right of 
nations to define who is a national and who is not; as well as to control immigration by controlling 
their borders; and (B), a “modern” notion of sovereignty susceptible of self-controls through a 
state’s sovereign decision to adhere to international standards of human rights.  
Integration a la European Union, becomes a true Hegelian synthesis of the dialectical 
opposition between (A) and (B), to the extent that eliminates the inequalities implied in (A) 
between nationals and foreigners. By the time an exercise of a sovereign right turns (A) into its 
opposite (B), the new notion of human rights has erased the previous inequalities between nationals 
and foreigners. The new product generated by the dialectical relations between (A) and (B), namely 
integration, implies that human rights applies equally to both, nationals and foreigners. Such is the 
meaning of the Schengen agreements. 
                                                     
13
  Malcolm Waters’ comments on Giddens’ definition, quoted above, help to clarify the meaning of globalization implied in the 
diagram: “This definition usefully introduces explicit notions of time and space into the argument. It emphasizes locality and thus 
territoriality and by this means stresses that the process of globalization is not merely or even mainly about such grand, center-stage 
activities as corporate mega-mergers and world political forums but about the autonomizations of local life worlds. Globalization, 
then, implies localization, a concept that is connected with Giddens’ other notions of relativization and reflexivity. The latter imply 
that the residents of a local area will increasingly come to want to make conscious decisions about which values and amenities they 
want to stress in their communities and that these decisions will increasingly be referenced against global scapes. Localization 
implies a reflexive reconstruction of community in the face of the dehumanizing implications of rationalizing and commodifying.” 
Waters (1995), Globalization (London: Routledge). 
14
  There are two contrasting notions of integration. One, predominant in the United States, derives from the studies of Robert Ezra 
Park, whose followers, according to Michael Haas, have argued “that differences between ethnic groups are a function of attitudes of 
prejudice” (Haas, 1992). This thesis assumes that such differences can be removed through intense interethnic interactions, which 
could lead to a color-blind society. About this assumption, Haas comments: “There are at least four flaws in integrationism. First, it 
is a theory of assimilation. The closer an ethnic group resembled the dominant culture, the more it would be “tolerated” and 
ultimately “accepted” and “admitted” to equal status…” The other notion of integration, predominant in Western Europe, is more 
recent. This is epitomized by the Schengen Agreement, binding for member states of the European Union, where integration means 
equal rights for nationals and foreigners. The latter notion is the one adopted in this article. 
15
  For an in-depth analysis of the historical context in which the notion of sovereignty has evolved, see Jens Bartelson (1995), A 
Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: University Press). 
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There seems to be a distance of light years between the empowerment to migrants that one 
can derive from legislation such as that recommended by the Schengen agreements and enacted by 
countries such as Spain, to grant voting rights to immigrants in local elections and, the conditions 
of vulnerability of migrants such as those exposed by the “operation gate keeper” at the US-Mexico 
border. However, when one takes into account the time it took for European countries to evolve 
from the “Treaty of Rome” in 1952 to the Schengen agreements to speak about “voting rights” to 
immigrants, one could hypothesize that immigrant’s rights will follow in America the evolutionary 
line marked in their history in Europe. That is the hypothesis behind the dialectics of vulnerability 
implicit in the diagram. 
A recount of the dialectical contradiction between (A) and (B) includes the notion that all 
nation states have the sovereign right to define who is a national and who is a foreigner, as well as 
the sovereign right to control their borders. In both cases, the implication is to define the frontier 
between the essential inner and outer components of a nation. Most democratic nations have these 
rights written in their constitutions. Although such legitimate distinctions, in most of the cases, do 
not explicitly place the foreigner,16 in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the national, when they 
interact socially within the receiving country, the duality (national-foreigner) is nevertheless very 
often transformed, or, socially constructed, into an object of a de facto discrimination against 
foreigners by nationals. As Robert Miles17 amply discusses, this distinction is implicit at the origin 
of all kinds of discriminatory practices against foreigners as such, at the personal, group, and 
institutional level. This implies a power structure wherein nationals are more likely to occupy 
dominant positions vis-à-vis foreigners, and the latter are more likely to occupy subordinate 
positions. In this, sort of a metamorphosis from the normative to the social, lies the virtual 
contradiction between immigration and human rights. In reality, there is no contradiction. The 
sovereign right that is implicit in the definition of each concept respectively, is of the same legal 
nature. They are two different notions of sovereignty with dialectically opposite meanings. Such a 
dialectical opposition was generated from the dynamics of international relations implied in the 
process of globalization. This is a similar paradox than what is implicit in all international 
agreements that become of a higher legal order than norms of internal legislation by virtue of the 
par excellence outcome of sovereignty, namely the Constitution.  
                                                     
16
  The terms “foreigner” and “immigrant” are used interchangeably in this article. 
17
  For a discussion of the dominant/subordinate relation of nationals/immigrants assumed in most recipient countries, see Robert 
Miles, op. cit. (particularly in reference to what he calls the problem of “Euro-racism”). 
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